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Abstract 
We study the effect of countries’ historical legacy with corruption on recent climate change 
policies and on global cooperation. Current policy outcomes build on policy choices made in 
previous years, and these choices were likely affected by the degree of corruption at the time. Our 
empirical findings using data for up to 131 countries suggest that accumulated historical 
experience with corruption is important for today’s policy outcomes, and appears to be more 
important than the current level of corruption.  
Keywords: Corruption; History; International Public Goods; Climate Change; Environmental 
Policy. 
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1. Introduction 
Suppose a country is currently relatively free of corruption. Does it matter for 
environmental policy outcomes whether this country has had low corruption for an extended time 
period (the good old days), or has suffered a long history of widespread corruption (the bad old 
days) and improved only very recently? That is, does a country’s path to today’s level of 
corruption matter for climate change policies? The climate change policies in effect today are the 
result of a myriad of decisions taken during the last few decades, and the level of corruption at 
the time these decisions were taken likely played an important role. In this paper, we make a first 
attempt to answer the above question, thereby also providing a fresh perspective in the vast 
literature on the effects of corruption more generally.  
Our approach is to create a measure of the “corruption-control capital stock”. The 
corruption-control capital stock is here defined as a country’s accumulated stock of historical 
experience with freedom from (i.e., control of) corruption, that is, the degree to which a country 
has accumulated experience with the absence (good old days) as opposed to the presence (bad old 
days) of corrupt practices in political, bureaucratic and economic activities, etc. The corruption 
control capital stock concept is similar to the “democratic capital stock” suggested by Persson 
and Tabellini (2009), defined as a country’s accumulated stock of civic and social assets built by 
historical experience with democracy. 
Our analysis sheds new light on the debate in the literature on whether corruption or 
democracy is the main determinant of environmental policy outcomes. Pellegrini and Gerlagh 
(2006) show that while current corruption is an important determinant of an index of agricultural 
environmental policy stringency (based on surveys completed by the relevant governments, 
business and non-governmental organization representatives), current democracy has a minor and 
statistically insignificant effect once corruption is included in the estimation model. We compare 
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the effect of the corruption-control capital stock with the impact of the democratic control stock, 
which Fredriksson and Neumayer (2013) found to be an important determinant of climate change 
policies. We find that both corruption and democracy are statistically significant and 
substantively important determinants of climate change policies and global environmental 
cooperation efforts, even when simultaneously included in the estimation models. 
Our empirical work utilizes two dependent variables. First, we use a composite index of 
multiple aspects of climate change policies, the Climate Laws, Institutions and Measures Index, 
created by Steves et al. (2011). Second, we employ a measure of the degree of global 
environmental cooperation from Esty et al. (2005). To create measures of the corruption control 
capital stock, we use two different corruption indices. These come from the International Country 
Risk Guide (ICRG) (time period 1982-2010) and the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance 
Indicators project (www.govindicators.org) (time period 1996-2010), respectively. The advantage 
of the ICRG data is their longer temporal availability, but they are available for fewer countries. 
The reverse holds for the World Bank’s indicators: they are available for more countries, but only 
for a shorter period of time. We have data for up to 131 countries, which in 2010 emitted almost 
99 percent of all CO2 emissions. 
Our results lend support to the hypothesis that countries’ historical experience with 
corruption matters for climate change policies, in particular global environmental cooperation. 
This suggests that corruption reform programs may not have immediate impacts on the 
propensity to cooperate on transboundary pollution problems, and patience is consequently 
warranted. Only over time will corruption-control yield results. On the other hand, an increase in 
the level of corruption (a reduction in corruption-control) may not have as severe effects in 
countries already benefiting from a large stock of corruption-control as part of their history. 
Finally, in contrast to Pellegrini and Gerlagh’s (2006) result for current corruption and current 
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democracy, we find that the democratic capital stock (years 1800-2010) is at least as robust a 
determinant of environmental policies as the corruption-control capital stock.  
Potential policy implications are that it appears important to take history into account 
when selecting countries for corruption reform programs, and when designing such efforts. Our 
findings reinforce the recommendation by Mungiu-Pippidi (2006) that corruption reduction 
programs in developing countries and the transition economies need to address the root causes of 
corruption with deep and long-running reform programs that include the political sector.  
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the effects of corruption on the 
environment and develops our argument why the history of corruption-control matters, as well as 
the existing literature. Section 3 discusses our empirical approach and data. Section 4 reports our 
main results, while Section 5 presents our robustness analysis. Section 6 provides a conclusion.  
2. Corruption and the Environment: Theory, Evidence, and Our Argument  
The theoretical literature argues that corruption has a negative impact on social welfare by 
reducing environmental quality and resource conservation. Lopéz and Mitra (2000) study how 
corruption affects the Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC). They find that corruption increases 
pollution levels above the socially optimal level and raises the income level at which the EKC 
turns downwards beyond the socially optimal level. Damania et al. (2003) and Fredriksson et al. 
(2004), e.g., provide models where the level of corruption is viewed as the relative importance of 
bribes versus social welfare to the government. With a greater emphasis on bribes, the 
government distorts environmental and energy policies away from the social optimum. Wilson 
and Damania (2005) consider political competition and corruption both among high-level 
politicians who set environmental policies, and lower-level bureaucrats who administer the 
resulting pollution standards. Lower-level corruption offers firms the opportunity to avoid the 
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enforcement of environmental policies. Fredriksson and Svensson (2003) and Damania et al. 
(2004) discuss the interaction effects on environmental policy of corruption and political 
instability, and the latter paper in addition considers the role of the judiciary and regulatory 
compliance failures. Barbier et al. (2005) and Barbier (2010) show how corruption distorts 
resource conservation. Welsch (2004) and Cole (2007) argue that while a direct effect exists of 
corruption on environmental regulation, we should also consider an indirect effect. This indirect 
link goes from corruption to economic growth to pollution levels as suggested by the EKC 
hypothesis. Biswas et al. (2012) study the effect of the shadow economy (informal sector) and 
how it interacts with corruption in the determination of pollution levels.  
Consistent with theory, the empirical literature shows that corruption has a negative effect 
on the stringency of environmental and energy policies, increases deforestation and air pollution, 
limits the access to public goods such as drinking water and sanitation, decreases natural capital, 
and affects Kyoto Protocol ratification (see, e.g., Fredriksson and Svensson, 2003; Damania et 
al., 2003; Fredriksson et al., 2004, 2007; Welsch, 2004; Barbier et al., 2005; Cole, 2007; Anbarci 
et al., 2009; Barbier, 2010; Leitão, 2010;  Ivanova, 2011; Biswas et al., 2012).
1
 Burgess et al. 
(2012) provide evidence of short run substitution between different forms of government 
corruption in Indonesia, in particular illegal deforestation and oil and gas revenue sharing. 
Pellegrini and Gerlagh (2006) show that while corruption is a highly important determinant of 
environmental policy outcomes, the level of democracy is of less importance: once corruption is 
included in the estimation, the size of its point estimate falls by at least 50 percent and ceases to 
be statistically significant. Oliva (2014) show how bribery enables drivers of older cars to 
circumvent car emission regulations in Mexico City. The literature has to the best of our 
                                                          
1
 See Holmberg et al. (2009) for a survey of the effects of governance and corruption on environmental 
sustainability. 
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knowledge not studied the effect of historical experience with corruption on environmental or any 
other policies.  
Corruption: Why Should Historical Experience Matter? 
The theories discussed above focus on the policy and environmental effects of the current 
corruption level. However, the environmental policies and pollution levels existing today are to a 
great extent the result of numerous historical policy, monitoring and enforcement choices, all 
influenced by the level of corruption at the time. Differences in current policy outcomes are 
therefore likely due to different historical experiences with corrupt activities, as previous policy 
and enforcement decisions set the stage for the next round of policy choices. Coate and Morris 
(1999) argue that interest groups will pursue strategies that raise their benefits from distorted 
policies. As they become more wedded to these policies over time, there is a higher probability 
that these policies persist. Thus, suppose a country is currently suffering from widespread 
corruption, but that it previously has experienced lower corruption levels. The policies 
determined under the earlier regime may persist as policies may not be dismantled immediately 
(Coate and Morris, 1999). Conversely, if a country is plagued by a history of corruption, even 
recent improvements in current corruption-control may be insufficient for changing policy 
outcomes. This view is reminiscent of the criticism leveled by Mungiu-Pippidi (2006) of 
corruption reduction programs in developing countries and the transition economies. If corruption 
is deeply entrenched in a “particularistic” political culture, reform programs that just borrow 
“best practices” from developed countries do not do enough to address the root causes of the 
problems. Deep and long-run reform programs that include the political sector appear to be 
needed.    
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One particular avenue through which the corruption-control capital stock may influence 
environmental policy making is by affecting expectations that a similar level of corruption-
control will continue in the future (Damania et al., 2004). Damania et al. suggest that reform of 
the judiciary is a gradual process and improvements may be delayed due to bribery. If corruption 
is expected to remain high in the future (as the country has a small corruption-control capital 
stock) political advocates in favor of stricter environmental policies should have a lower 
incentive to expand effort and resources, as any policy reforms are unlikely to remain in future 
time periods.  
Another reason why improvements in corruption levels may not have immediate effects is 
that environmental policy may be considered a “secondary policy” (List and Sturm, 2006). This 
policy area may not be the first policy priority, and a delay may therefore be expected in the 
upgrading of environmental standards and policies.  
3. Empirical Approach and Data 
We will test the hypothesis that a higher stock of corruption-control capital increases the 
stringency of climate change policies and global environmental cooperation. Our first and main 
dependent variable is a measure of the stringency of climate change policies across countries, 
namely Steves et al.’s (2011) Climate Laws, Institutions and Measures Index (CLIMI), based on 
the 2005-2010 annual national communications to the UNFCCC. CLIMI seeks to measure the 
policies countries have adopted to address climate change through mitigation (and not 
adaptation). The components of CLIMI are (relative weight and within-component sub-weights 
within parenthesis): international cooperation (0.1) (subgroups: Kyoto ratification (0.5), Joint 
Implementation or Clean Development Mechanism host (0.5)), domestic climate framework (0.4) 
(subgroups: cross-sectoral climate change legislation (0.33), carbon emissions target (0.33), 
dedicated climate change institution (0.33)), significant sectoral fiscal or regulatory measures or 
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targets (0.4) (subgroups: energy supplies/renewables (0.3), industry (0.2), forestry (0.17), 
agriculture (0.13), transport (0.13), buildings (0.07)), and additional cross-sectoral fiscal or 
regulatory measures (0.1). CLIMI takes values between 0 and 1, where higher values represent 
stricter policies. Tonga has the lowest CLIMI score at 0.011, while the UK has the highest at 
0.801. CLIMI is derived from information collected over the period 2005-2010. All values for our 
explanatory variables are averages over this time period. The second dependent variable is a 
measure of global environmental cooperation from Esty et al. (2005), the Global Environmental 
Cooperation Index (GLOBAL). This index is a combination of information pertaining to a 
country’s number of memberships in environmental intergovernmental organizations, 
contribution to international and bilateral funding of environmental projects and development aid, 
and participation in international environmental agreements.  
 The independent variables of main interest are ICRG (WB) Corruption-Control Current 
and ICRG (WB) Corruption-Control Capital, with data taken from 
www.prsgroup.com/ICRG.aspx and www.govindicators.org, respectively. Corruption-control 
capital accumulates each year with an amount equal to the ICRG (WB) score, and depreciates at a 
rate δ)1(   per year. That is, a share remains of the prior year’s capital stock. Let tih , be the 
stock of democratic capital of country i in year t; tic , is the corruption-control variable of country 
i. Corruption-control capital accumulates according to ,1,,,  tititi hch   where .00, tih  We 
calculate and utilize values for ICRG and WB corruption-control capital for 1982 and 
1996, respectively, and assume 0.06,δ)1(   consistent with our measure of democratic capital, 
discussed below. However, our results are robust to using alternative assumptions about the 
depreciation rate (see section 5). Note that contrary to the democratic capital stock measure in 
Persson and Tabellini (2009) in which a dichotomous accumulation variable (a country is 
δ
0t 0t
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democratic or not) is used, we cannot use a dichotomous cut-off for corruption control since there 
is neither agreement in the literature where such a cut-off might lie, nor would any cut-off 
suggest itself in the source data. Both stock variables are re-scaled to fall into the 0 to 1 interval. 
For both Corruption-Control Current and Corruption-Control Capital, we therefore use the 
categorical ICRG data, which vary from 1 (most corrupt) to 6 (least corrupt), and the continuous 
WB data, which vary from -1.44 (most corrupt) to 2.45 (least corrupt).  
As control variables, we include measures of the democratic capital stock and the current 
level of democracy, both building on the polity2 variable from the Polity IV data set (Marshall 
and Jaggers, 2007). We create Democratic Capital using the 1800-2010 time period. Polity2 
takes values between -10 (strict autocracy) and 10 (consolidated democracy). We define 
democracies as those countries having a positive polity2 score, following Persson and Tabellini 
(2009). Current Democracy is the average polity2 value for years 2005-2010. Note that while 
democracy and corruption are not uncorrelated with each other, the two do not measure the same 
latent construct, either theoretically or empirically (current democracy correlates at r = .25 with 
Corruption-control Current if measured by ICRG and at r = .32 if measured by the WB 
measure). Following Persson and Tabellini (2009), the democratic capital stock accumulates in 
years in which a country is a democracy (an increase of one) but not when an autocracy, defined 
as a polity2 values of 0 or below. Democratic capital depreciates at the same rate as corruption-
control capital, δ)1(   per year. Let  be the stock of democratic capital of country i in year t; 
is an indicator variable which takes a value of unity in years when country i is a democracy; 
zero otherwise. Democratic capital then accumulates according to  where 
 We calculate and utilize values for Democratic Capital for 1800 and use 
tiz ,
tia ,
,1,,,  tititi zaz 
.0
0,
tiz 0t
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0.06,δ)1(  . The resulting values are rescaled to lie in the range 0 to (converging to) 1 (by 
multiplying all calculated values by δ)),1(   following Persson and Tabellini. 
We measure lobbying and voters’ incentives using two different variables. CO2 per capita 
emissions (from World Bank, 2012) reflects consumers’ incentive to bring about lower fossil fuel 
prices, and the fossil fuel producers’ lobbying incentive to weaken climate change policies. 
Consequently, CO2 per capita emissions reflects the amount at stake for CO2 emitters, and their 
incentive to undertake lobbying activities. However, higher levels of per capita CO2 may also 
imply lower marginal abatement costs (Fredriksson et al., 2007). While CLIMI and GLOBAL 
may already have affected CO2 per capita emissions, the resulting reverse causality should be 
sufficiently small not to create strong concerns about endogeneity. For example, our results are 
not affected by dropping this variable. KP Commitment measures the emission reduction 
commitment in percent emission reductions relative to 1990 (or an alternative base year) of 
Annex I countries under the Kyoto Protocol. Countries with a Kyoto Protocol commitment may 
be expected to set stricter climate change policies, as shown by Aichele and Felbermayr (2012). 
In the estimations reported below, KP Commitment equals zero for all non-Annex 1 countries as 
they do not have any emission reduction targets. The results are however fully robust toward 
setting this variable to -8 for all non-Annex 1 countries. -8 is the observed minimum among 
Annex 1 countries in the sample (Australia was permitted to increase its emissions by 8 percent, 
hence it scores -8).
2
 We recognize that similarly to CO2 per capita emissions, KP Commitment 
could also be subject to reverse causality if countries which anticipated to undertake future 
climate change policies were more willing to sign up to more stringent commitments under the 
                                                          
2
 Results for this alternative operationalization of KP Commitment are available upon request. 
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Kyoto Protocol. In the absence of plausibly valid instruments, in additional estimations we 
dropped this variable and found that the results uphold.  
To control for the effect that non-Annex 1 countries have on this variable, we include a 
Non-Annex 1 dummy. GDPpc is per capita income in US$ in purchasing power parity 
(thousands), and captures the increased demand for environmental quality as income rises (World 
Bank, 2012). Table 1 provides descriptive statistics, including a number of further control 
variables included in our robustness tests. 
In sum, we estimate variants of the following model using ordinary least squares (OLS): 
 
CLIMIi = α + ß0Corruption-control Currenti + ß1Corruption-control Capitali  
+ ß2 KP Commitmenti + ß3Non-Annex 1 dummyi + ß4CO2 per capita emissionsi + ß5GDPpci  
+ ß6 Current Democracyi + ß7Democratic Capitali + εi ,                                                            (1) 
 
where α is a constant, i denotes country, ßi, i=0,.,7, are variable coefficients, and εi is the error 
term. The identical model is estimated for GLOBAL as dependent variable. 
Since our sample is cross-sectional, we cannot control for unobserved country 
heterogeneity with the help of country fixed effects. We have attempted to account for the 
possibility that Corruption-control Capital is correlated with the error term by instrumenting for 
it in two-stage least squares, using as instruments either corruption-control in neighboring 
countries or a measure of the remoteness of the capital city based on Campante and Do (2010). 
However, in all instrumental variable regressions the instruments are weak, making it infeasible 
to present such models.  
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4. Empirical Results 
The first set of OLS results are presented in Table 2. Due to the high correlation between 
Corruption-control Current and Corruption-control Capital (r = .88 for ICRG and r = .92 for 
WB measure), we start by including only the former. In Table 3, we include both. Models 1-4 use 
CLIMI, while Models 5-8 use GLOBAL. We start with the CLIMI models. In addition to our basic 
control variables, Models 1 and 3 use the ICRG and WB Corruption-control Stock measure, 
respectively, while Models 2 and 4 include the ICRG and WB Corruption-control Current 
measures, respectively. While the ICRG measures do not significantly affect CLIMI, both WB 
measures in Models 3-4 have positive and statistically significant effects.
3
 Turning to the 
GLOBAL models, Models 5 and 7 use the ICRG and WB Corruption-control Stock measure, 
respectively, while Models 6 and 8 include the ICRG and WB Corruption-control Current 
measures, respectively. Models 5-8 all exhibit significant positive coefficients on the corruption-
control measures.  
Thus, overall we find evidence that both the current level of corruption-control and the 
stock of corruption-control matter for climate change policies and cooperation. However, we 
cannot determine which of these measures dominates. The WB corruption-control measures 
consistently have statistically significant effects, perhaps due to a higher number of observations. 
Another potential reason for these findings is that the World Bank measure is an aggregate 
composite of multiple sources and might thus provide a more reliable measure of a country’s 
level of corruption control than the ICRG measure, which is based on experts’ opinions with a 
view toward informing potential foreign investors. 
                                                          
3
 In additional estimations (available upon request), we find that this difference in results is not due to the larger 
sample size using the WB measures. If we artificially restrict Models 3-4 to the samples used in Models 1-2, the 
corruption-control measures based on the World Bank source continue to be statistically significant. 
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Turning to the control variables in Table 2, a number of our control variables are 
generally significant with the expected signs, including KP Commitments, GDP per capita, and 
Democratic Capital. CO2 per capita emissions was expected to have ambiguous effects. We find 
that it is consistently negative in all models, suggesting that higher emissions intensity makes 
voters and firms exert downward pressure on environmental policy stringency and cooperation.  
In Table 3, we enter measures of both the current and the stock of corruption-control in 
each model. As mentioned above, the current and stock measures are highly correlated and 
estimation models with both included show relatively high variance inflation factors. We also add 
a Current Democracy dummy in four of the models. Overall, it appears that our two measures of 
corruption-control stocks (ICRG and WB) are more important than the corresponding measures 
of current corruption-control. Corruption-control Stock (ICRG) is significant in Models 3-4, 
while Corruption-control Stock (WB) is significant in Models 7-8; current corruption-control is 
significant only in Model 7 (and with a negative sign). Only models using GLOBAL exhibit 
significant corruption-control coefficients. Apart from a larger number of observations for these 
models than the CLIMI models (123 and 139 versus, respectively, 82 and 93), one has to keep in 
mind the high correlation between the current and stock of corruption-control variables. In our 
view, it is notable that despite this high correlation, Corruption-control Stock remains statistically 
significant in the models using GLOBAL, consistent with Table 2.  
We note that our measures of corruption are not without criticism, and our findings 
should be interpreted in this light (see, e.g., Knack, 2007; Ko and Samajdar, 2010; Donchev and 
Ujhelyi, 2014; and the references therein).
4
 One potential issue is, e.g., that past corruption may 
affect current values. While this is a concern, since our study seeks to take countries’ historical 
                                                          
4
 The main contribution of this paper is to propose a measure of corruption which takes historical experience into 
account (using existing corruption measures) in the determination of climate change policies. We leave it for future 
research to study the possible advantages of alternative corruption measures for this line of research.  
14 
 
experience with corruption into account, we believe it is preferable to use a weighted average of 
past values rather than to simply use current values of corruption (which are possibly affected by 
historical experience, but to an uncertain degree). Moreover, since our results indicate that 
Corruption-Control Capital is a significant predictor when controlling for Corruption-Control 
Current, it appears likely that the former variable matters in addition to the latter variable.  
The control variables in Table 3 show a pattern similar to Table 2. In particular, 
Democratic Capital is significant in all models. Current Democracy is marginally significant in 
only two models, and then with a negative sign. Once we control for Democratic Capital Stock, 
any apparent positive effect of Current Democracy on GLOBAL disappears, consistent with 
Fredriksson and Neumayer (2013). 
5. Robustness Analysis 
In Tables 4-6 we test the robustness of our inferences toward plausible changes in model 
specification. Table 4 adds a number of additional control variables to the estimation models 
reported in Table 2. We include GDP per capita growth (an average over the 2005-10 time 
period) since the growth rate may affect the likelihood of adopting stronger climate change 
policies. We additionally include a measure of Climate Vulnerability from Wheeler (2011) since 
more vulnerable countries might engage in stronger climate policies. However, note that CLIMI 
refers to mitigation measures rather than adaptation policies. A Small Island State dummy takes 
into account the urgency of policymakers to take action in countries threatened by sea-level rise; 
it comes from World Bank (2012). Again, however, since CLIMI refers to mitigation rather than 
adaptation, it is unclear whether one would expect a significant effect of this variable, not least 
given that small island nation states are typically not large emitters of greenhouse gases. Trade 
Openness is taken from World Bank (2012), measured as imports plus exports divided by GDP. 
Neumayer (2002) provides evidence that more open countries co-operate more on global 
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environmental problems. Political Stability, sourced from Beck et al. (2001), affects the time 
horizon of politicians and thus their propensity to incur short-term cost in order to obtain long 
term benefits (Bohn and Deacon, 2000; Fredriksson and Wollscheid, 2014). Political stability 
fosters investment in “state capacity” (Besley and Persson, 2011), which in turn increases the 
provision of public goods. Legal origin has been shown to influence policymaking, institutions 
and economic growth in fundamental ways (La Porta et al., 1999); we utilize dummies for 
French, Socialist, German, and Scandinavian Legal Origins (British Legal Origin is the excluded 
category). 
 The results in Table 4 are fully robust toward the inclusion of further control variables.
5
 
Faster-growing countries tend to set stricter climate policies, though note that the effect is only 
marginally statistically significant in two regressions. Neither climate vulnerability nor small 
island status exert a significant effect. More politically stable countries have better climate 
policies, but generally do not co-operate more on global environmental issues. Trade openness 
does not matter, while countries with a French or Scandinavian legal origin are relatively more 
committed to global environmental co-operation. A socialist legal origin (somewhat surprisingly) 
appears to put more stringent climate policies in place. 
 In Table 5, we report results from regional jackknife robustness tests, where we drop the 
countries from one region (as defined by the World Bank) at a time. The purpose is to see 
whether the results are driven by any particular region. Due to space constraints, we apply the 
regional jackknife test to Models 1, 3, 5 and 7 of Table 2 only, i.e. the models that include the 
Corruption-control Stock (but not those that include Corruption-control Current). All other 
                                                          
5
 One may be concerned that because corruption-control capital is set to zero for all countries in the first year of each 
sample, we could under-estimate the effect of corruption-control capital considering that the actual experience with 
corruption started at an earlier point in time.  In an additional robustness test we explore whether this initial under-
estimation threatens our inferences. We set the initial value of corruption-control capital to the first available value of 
the corruption-control level rather than to zero. Our results are fully robust. 
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control variables are included in the estimation model, but their results are not reported. The 
results reported in Table 5 echo those in Table 2. We can therefore be quite certain that our 
inferences are not driven by countries from any one particular region. 
In Table 6, we report results for alternative Corruption-control Capital depreciation rates 
(1%, 3%, 9%, and 12%) using the corresponding models from Table 2. The rationale is that it is 
unclear what a reasonable depreciation rate is, hence we use a range of depreciation rates from 
very low to very high to test whether our results depend on the specific rate of 6% assumed in the 
baseline model. Table 6 shows that this is not the case: The results are again fully robust.  
 
6. Conclusion 
This paper introduces the concept of a corruption-control capital stock, which takes a country’s 
history of fighting corruption into account. We find that this historical measure of corruption 
affects current climate change policies and global environmental cooperation in (up to) 131 
countries. An accumulated history of being relatively free of corruption facilitates achieving 
global cooperation on environmentally sustainable development (see Barbier and Markandya, 
1990). The policy implications are that corruption reforms need to be deep and comprehensive 
and have a long term perspective, otherwise the effects of the bad old days are likely to persist. 
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Table 1. Summary Statistics  
 
Variables  Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
CLIMI 88 0.36 0.23 0.02 0.80 
GLOBAL  
131 0.05 0.72 -1.69 1.74 
KP Commitments  
131 1.61 3.30 -8 8 
Non-Annex 1 dummy 
131 0.74 0.44 0 1 
CO2 emission per capita 
131 4.63 5.74 0.02 31.16 
GDP per capita 
131 12.52 13.65 0.38 57.79 
GDP per capita growth 
131 0.03 0.03 -0.08 0.15 
Democratic Capital 
131 0.56 0.36 0 0.99 
Current Democracy 
130 0.73 0.43 0 1 
Climate Vulnerability 
131 19.27 18.64 -7.74 100 
Trade Openness 
129 84.96 36.89 0.22 203.83 
Political Stability 
130 0.12 0.10 0 0.5 
Small Island State 
131 0.02 0.12 0 1 
French Legal Origin 
131 0.44 0.50 0 1 
Socialist Legal Origin 
131 0.24 0.43 0 1 
German Legal Origin 
131 0.03 0.17 0 1 
Scandinavian Legal Origin 
131 0.03 0.17 0 1 
Corruption-control Stock (ICRG) 
115 0.36 0.15 0.12 0.77 
Corruption-control Current (ICRG) 
115 2.57 1.12 0.81 6 
Corruption-control Stock (WB) 
131 0.21 0.11 0.07 0.49 
Corruption-control Current (WB) 
131 -0.12 1 -1.63 2.45 
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Table 2. Main regressions. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Dependent variable: CLIMI CLIMI CLIMI CLIMI GLOBAL GLOBAL GLOBAL GLOBAL 
                  
KP Commitments  0.0173*** 0.0183*** 0.0173*** 0.0176*** 0.0257* 0.0288* 0.0167 0.0190 
 (0.00463) (0.00475) (0.00478) (0.00476) (0.0144) (0.0163) (0.0189) (0.0177) 
Non-Annex 1 dummy -0.0483 -0.0314 -0.0363 -0.0381 0.303* 0.393** 0.323 0.327 
 (0.0583) (0.0585) (0.0546) (0.0544) (0.161) (0.180) (0.201) (0.198) 
CO2 per capita emissions -0.0132*** -0.0117** -0.0107** -0.0111*** -0.0375*** -0.0402*** -0.0415*** -0.0438*** 
 (0.00458) (0.00490) (0.00423) (0.00421) (0.00975) (0.0114) (0.0110) (0.0115) 
GDP per capita 0.00830*** 0.00718*** 0.00497** 0.00550** 0.00976* 0.0129* 0.00576 0.0121 
 (0.00195) (0.00220) (0.00237) (0.00235) (0.00549) (0.00699) (0.00802) (0.00858) 
Democratic Capital 0.131* 0.136** 0.116** 0.121** 0.339* 0.497*** 0.568*** 0.609*** 
 (0.0658) (0.0616) (0.0499) (0.0506) (0.185) (0.177) (0.180) (0.185) 
Corruption-control Stock (ICRG) 0.100    2.744***    
 (0.152)    (0.381)    
Corruption-control Current (ICRG)  0.0286    0.307***   
  (0.0227)    (0.0669)   
Corruption-control Stock (WB)   0.571**    3.983***  
   (0.249)    (1.027)  
Corruption-control Current (WB)    0.0540**    0.339*** 
    (0.0259)    (0.110) 
Constant 0.175* 0.128 0.115 0.236*** -1.253*** -1.257*** -1.272*** -0.478* 
 (0.0927) (0.100) (0.0813) (0.0767) (0.214) (0.270) (0.277) (0.252) 
         
Observations 77 77 88 88 115 115 131 131 
Adj. R-squared 0.664 0.671 0.703 0.700 0.486 0.431 0.471 0.443 
Robust standard errors in parentheses         
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1         
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Table 3. Simultaneous inclusion of Corruption-control Stock and Corruption-control Current 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Dependent variable: CLIMI CLIMI CLIMI CLIMI GLOBAL GLOBAL GLOBAL GLOBAL 
                  
KP Commitments  0.0185*** 0.0184*** 0.0171*** 0.0173*** 0.0274* 0.0268* 0.0130 0.0152 
 (0.00471) (0.00474) (0.00475) (0.00484) (0.0155) (0.0156) (0.0178) (0.0184) 
Non-Annex 1 dummy -0.0254 -0.0382 -0.0367 -0.0426 0.332* 0.238 0.288 0.212 
 (0.0577) (0.0615) (0.0549) (0.0576) (0.174) (0.179) (0.191) (0.197) 
CO2 per capita emissions -0.0116** -0.0120** -0.0107** -0.0106** -0.0360*** -0.0372*** -0.0439*** -0.0424*** 
 (0.00495) (0.00498) (0.00422) (0.00429) (0.01000) (0.0100) (0.0103) (0.0102) 
GDP per capita 0.00729*** 0.00713*** 0.00508** 0.00482* 0.00825 0.00682 0.00640 0.00348 
 (0.00226) (0.00228) (0.00234) (0.00243) (0.00585) (0.00574) (0.00738) (0.00723) 
Democratic Capital 0.148** 0.223* 0.116** 0.150* 0.344* 0.885*** 0.586*** 1.182*** 
 (0.0656) (0.112) (0.0502) (0.0849) (0.184) (0.331) (0.180) (0.289) 
Current Democracy  -0.0713  -0.0370  -0.495*  -0.554** 
  (0.0965)  (0.0707)  (0.262)  (0.233) 
Corruption-control Stock (ICRG) -0.110 -0.155   2.386*** 2.130***   
 (0.210) (0.210)   (0.566) (0.614)   
Corruption-control Current (ICRG) 0.0406 0.0399   0.0694 0.0497   
 (0.0315) (0.0325)   (0.0908) (0.0933)   
Corruption-control Stock (WB)   0.816 0.659   8.612*** 7.229*** 
   (0.652) (0.668)   (2.492) (2.627) 
Corruption-control Current (WB)   -0.0283 -0.0126   -0.519* -0.407 
   (0.0658) (0.0670)   (0.279) (0.285) 
Constant 0.123 0.163 0.0587 0.109 -1.317*** -1.029*** -2.299*** -1.837*** 
 (0.100) (0.118) (0.161) (0.175) (0.247) (0.283) (0.585) (0.645) 
         
Observations 77 77 88 87 115 115 131 130 
Adj. R-squared 0.667 0.666 0.700 0.693 0.484 0.498 0.481 0.500 
Robust standard errors in parentheses         
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1         
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Table 4. Robustness Tests: Further Control Variables 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Dependent variable: CLIMI CLIMI CLIMI CLIMI GLOBAL GLOBAL GLOBAL GLOBAL 
                  
KP Commitments  0.0160** 0.0171** 0.0156** 0.0164** 0.0285** 0.0311** 0.0243 0.0263* 
 (0.00711) (0.00694) (0.00647) (0.00640) (0.0128) (0.0147) (0.0165) (0.0154) 
Non-Annex 1 dummy -0.0215 0.0172 0.0181 -0.000605 0.0822 0.0204 -0.0435 -0.0853 
 (0.0903) (0.0864) (0.0780) (0.0721) (0.190) (0.211) (0.200) (0.189) 
CO2/capita emissions  -0.00976* -0.00859 -0.00830* -0.00854* -0.0232* -0.0204 -0.0110 -0.0114 
 (0.00554) (0.00532) (0.00421) (0.00436) (0.0123) (0.0133) (0.0132) (0.0132) 
GDP per capita 0.00995*** 0.00922*** 0.00718*** 0.00757*** 0.00495 0.00427 -0.00741 -0.00324 
 (0.00269) (0.00269) (0.00253) (0.00264) (0.00679) (0.00782) (0.00793) (0.00824) 
GDP per capita growth 1.380 1.227 1.332* 1.444* 2.410 2.753 3.056 3.464 
 (0.885) (0.894) (0.709) (0.728) (2.583) (2.557) (2.286) (2.331) 
Democratic Capital 0.127* 0.138* 0.119** 0.124** 0.328 0.418** 0.523*** 0.539*** 
 (0.0717) (0.0705) (0.0535) (0.0549) (0.210) (0.208) (0.187) (0.194) 
Climate Vulnerability 0.000739 0.000767 0.000556 0.000519 0.00287 0.00269 0.00152 0.00160 
 (0.00120) (0.00120) (0.00101) (0.00109) (0.00295) (0.00360) (0.00398) (0.00419) 
Trade Openness -0.000157 -0.000258 -0.000415 -0.000356 -0.00137 -0.00134 -0.00116 -0.00102 
 (0.000554) (0.000546) (0.000453) (0.000438) (0.00157) (0.00168) (0.00140) (0.00146) 
Political Stability 0.273* 0.306* 0.211 0.217 -0.260 -0.185 -0.356 -0.267 
 (0.161) (0.168) (0.144) (0.148) (0.435) (0.443) (0.418) (0.425) 
Small Island State 0.0784 0.0984 0.0912 0.106* -0.0862 -0.0994 -0.249 -0.238 
 (0.0912) (0.0937) (0.0590) (0.0605) (0.247) (0.254) (0.227) (0.237) 
French Legal Origin 0.0867 0.101 0.108* 0.0990 0.225* 0.240 0.269** 0.270** 
 (0.0713) (0.0702) (0.0585) (0.0615) (0.135) (0.145) (0.132) (0.134) 
Socialist Legal Origin 0.117 0.150* 0.164** 0.137* -0.0476 -0.209 -0.298 -0.347* 
 (0.0914) (0.0881) (0.0721) (0.0737) (0.224) (0.235) (0.201) (0.204) 
German Legal Origin 0.101 0.0982 0.102 0.0986 0.367 0.379 0.385 0.399 
 (0.0869) (0.0882) (0.0817) (0.0811) (0.371) (0.374) (0.356) (0.347) 
Scandinavian Legal  0.113 0.0922 0.0897 0.0997 0.461** 0.568*** 0.614*** 0.668*** 
     Origin (0.0990) (0.0909) (0.0763) (0.0764) (0.176) (0.187) (0.163) (0.157) 
Corruption-control  0.158    2.145***    
     Stock (ICRG) (0.216)    (0.446)    
Corruption-control      0.0450    0.207***   
     Current (ICRG)  (0.0316)    (0.0711)   
Corruption-control    0.836**    3.076***  
     Stock (WB)   (0.348)    (0.992)  
Corruption-control     0.0714**    0.249** 
     Current (WB)    (0.0333)    (0.107) 
Constant -0.0518 -0.151 -0.172 0.0248 
-
0.947*** -0.727* -0.800* -0.170 
 (0.161) (0.167) (0.134) (0.110) (0.343) (0.422) (0.407) (0.344) 
Observations 73 73 84 84 111 111 127 127 
Adj. R-squared 0.673 0.686 0.730 0.722 0.486 0.445 0.521 0.501 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.    
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Table 5. Robustness Tests: Regional jackknives 
 Excluded region: 
East Asia 
& Pacific 
Eastern Europe & 
Central Asia South Asia 
Middle East 
& North Africa 
Sub-Saharan 
Africa Western Europe 
North 
America 
Latin America 
& Caribbean 
Dependent variable: CLIMI CLIMI CLIMI CLIMI CLIMI CLIMI CLIMI CLIMI 
Corruption-control Stock (ICRG) 0.0282 0.263 0.102 0.00892 0.230 0.0607 0.162 0.0946 
 (0.151) (0.228) (0.152) (0.174) (0.141) (0.194) (0.144) (0.150) 
Observations 68 56 76 70 66 61 75 67 
Adj. R-squared 0.729 0.669 0.665 0.653 0.697 0.382 0.709 0.689 
 
 Excluded region: 
East Asia 
& Pacific 
Eastern Europe & 
Central Asia South Asia 
Middle East 
& North Africa 
Sub-Saharan 
Africa Western Europe 
North 
America 
Latin America 
& Caribbean 
Dependent variable: CLIMI CLIMI CLIMI CLIMI CLIMI CLIMI CLIMI CLIMI 
Corruption-control Stock (WB) 0.557* 0.811*** 0.568** 0.416 0.572** 0.657** 0.635*** 0.552** 
 (0.287) (0.292) (0.250) (0.302) (0.239) (0.320) (0.237) (0.268) 
Observations 78 60 87 81 74 72 86 78 
Adj. R-squared 0.754 0.706 0.704 0.700 0.734 0.454 0.744 0.726 
 
 Excluded region: 
East Asia 
& Pacific 
Eastern Europe & 
Central Asia South Asia 
Middle East 
& North Africa 
Sub-Saharan 
Africa Western Europe 
North 
America 
Latin America 
& Caribbean 
Dependent variable: GLOBAL GLOBAL GLOBAL GLOBAL GLOBAL GLOBAL GLOBAL GLOBAL 
Corruption-control Stock (ICRG) 2.873*** 2.845*** 2.810*** 2.342*** 2.664*** 2.491*** 2.795*** 2.880*** 
 (0.386) (0.578) (0.383) (0.387) (0.445) (0.452) (0.391) (0.391) 
Observations 103 95 111 102 88 99 113 94 
Adj. R-squared 0.522 0.467 0.494 0.482 0.556 0.289 0.483 0.519 
 
 Excluded region: 
East Asia 
& Pacific 
Eastern Europe & 
Central Asia South Asia 
Middle East 
& North Africa 
Sub-Saharan 
Africa Western Europe 
North 
America 
Latin America 
& Caribbean 
Dependent variable: GLOBAL GLOBAL GLOBAL GLOBAL GLOBAL GLOBAL GLOBAL GLOBAL 
Corruption-control Stock (WB) 4.112*** 3.890*** 4.460*** 2.683*** 3.883*** 3.601*** 4.010*** 4.932*** 
 (1.098) (1.125) (1.060) (0.963) (1.167) (1.140) (1.044) (1.192) 
Observations 117 105 125 118 98 115 129 110 
Adj. R-squared 0.486 0.467 0.482 0.474 0.555 0.293 0.467 0.510 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. All models contain control variables (not reported for space reasons). 
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Table 6. Robustness Tests: Different corruption-control capital depreciation rates 
 Depreciation rate: 1 % 3% 9% 12% 
Dependent variable: CLIMI CLIMI CLIMI CLIMI 
Corruption-control Stock (ICRG) 0.260 0.124 0.101 0.106 
 (0.495) (0.213) (0.139) (0.137) 
Observations 77 77 77 77 
Adj. R-squared 0.664 0.664 0.665 0.665 
 
 Depreciation rate: 1 % 3% 9% 12% 
Dependent variable: CLIMI CLIMI CLIMI CLIMI 
Corruption-control Stock (WB) 2.697** 0.992** 0.435** 0.370** 
 (1.148) (0.426) (0.193) (0.166) 
Observations 88 88 88 88 
Adj. R-squared 0.704 0.704 0.703 0.702 
 
 Depreciation rate: 1 % 3% 9% 12% 
Dependent variable: GLOBAL GLOBAL GLOBAL GLOBAL 
Corruption-control Stock (ICRG) 8.774*** 3.827*** 2.475*** 2.368*** 
 (1.262) (0.539) (0.350) (0.349) 
Observations 115 115 115 115 
Adj. R-squared 0.482 0.484 0.483 0.477 
 
 Depreciation rate: 1 % 3% 9% 12% 
Dependent variable: GLOBAL GLOBAL GLOBAL GLOBAL 
Corruption-control Stock (WB) 18.67*** 6.887*** 3.044*** 2.594*** 
 (4.695) (1.749) (0.797) (0.690) 
Observations 131 131 131 131 
Adj. R-squared 0.474 0.473 0.470 0.468 
 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. All models contain control variables (not reported for space reasons). 
